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Abstract: Paper introduces the improved version of a credit scoring model which assesses credit worthiness 
of applicants for a loan. The scorecard has a two-level multilevel structure which nests applicants for a loan 
within microenvironments. Paper discusses several versions of the multilevel scorecards which includes 
random-intercept, random-coefficients and group-level variables. The primary benefit of the multilevel 
scorecard compared to a conventional scoring model is a higher accuracy of the model predictions.  
 
 
Key words: Credit scoring, Hierarchical clustering, Multilevel model, Random-coefficient, Random-intercept, Monte 
Carlo Markov chain. 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
 
 
In retail banking consumer credit scoring plays an important role as a valuable instrument 
for a decision-making process. Lenders apply scoring models in order to assess credit worthiness of 
applicants for a loan and forecast the probability of default.  This paper contributes to the literature 
on credit scoring and introduces a new type of a credit scoring model which has a multilevel 
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structure.   The multilevel scorecard  is an improved alternative to a conventional logistic scoring 
model which is regularly applied in retail banking. In addition, paper proposes a new type of 
clustering for a hierarchical two-level structure which is more intuitive and efficient in the 
application to credit scoring.  The structure allows exploring the microenvironment-specific effects 
which are viewed as the unobserved determinants of default. Including microenvironment-effects 
helps to improve the forecasting accuracy  and evaluate the impact of the particular group-level 
characteristics on the riskiness of borrowers. 
In general, multilevel statistical modelling assumes that the data for the analysis is nested 
within groups. In this set up groups represents the higher-level units and  observations are the 
lower-level units.  The structure implies that units within the same group share more similarities 
than units within different groups.  Multilevel models are frequently applied in the field of social 
science (Steele and Durrant (2009)), political science (Gelman and Hill (2007)) and education 
(Goldstein and McConell (2007)). In particular, Goldstein (1998) applied a hierarchical structure 
where pupils are nested within schools to evaluate school effectiveness and compare pupils’ 
achievements between and within schools.  
The paper is divided into three parts: theoretical, empirical and discussions. The first section 
introduces the multilevel structure and explains the motivation for the particular type of a 
hierarchical structure.  In addition, it provides the summary of the data used in the empirical 
analysis and describes the sources of the data collection. I split the sample into two parts (training 
and testing samples) in order to compare the out-of-sample performance between the multilevel 
scoring models and a conventional scorecard.  
The empirical part introduces several versions of the multilevel credit scoring models which 
differ by the composition of random-effects and group-level characteristics.    I apply a ROC curve 
analysis to assess the predictive accuracy of the scorecards and calculate several postestimation 
diagnostics which check the goodness-of-fit and help to compare the credit scoring models. 
Section 4 evaluates the economic significance of the proposed multilevel structure and 
provides a graphical illustration of the fitted model results.  In addition, it shows that the quality of 
borrowers varies greatly between poor and rich living areas. Applying multilevel modelling allows 
to account for this heterogeneity.    
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2  Microenvironment and a multilevel structure 
 
 
In the multilevel credit scoring the main goal is to define the unobserved characteristics which 
influence riskiness of a customer additionally to the observed characteristics on borrowers such as 
income, marital status and a credit history. Accordingly, I define a two-level hierarchical structure for a 
scoring model which allows including the unobserved determinants of default (random-effects).  The 
structure nests applicants for a loan within microenvironments. In this case the borrowers are the level-
one units and microenvironments are the second-level groups. Each microenvironment represents a 
living area of a borrower with a particular combination of socio-economic and demographic conditions.  
There are several reasons why including information on microenvironments in the credit scoring 
model is important and advantageous.  First, it shows that borrowers from dissimilar living areas have 
exposure to the different risk factors which impact their probabilities of default. It is evident that poor 
living areas have higher unemployment rates, crime rates, contain a lower share of individuals with a 
college degree and have a lower level of housing wealth. In such microenvironments individuals have a 
higher chance to experience an adverse event such as damage of a property, an unexpected income cut or 
health problems.  It is also true that the overall quality of borrowers is lower in low income regions 
compared to the richer regions which contain fewer borrowers with a derogatory credit history. In this 
case the microenvironment-specific effects are viewed as the random determinants of riskiness which 
trigger probability of default. Specifying random-effects and including them in the scoring model  
improves a credit worthiness assessment of borrowers.  
Second, clustering of borrowers within microenvironments allows exploring the impact of the 
microenvironment-level characteristics on default. In section 3 I evaluate and discuss how  area income, 
real estate wealth and socio-demographic conditions influence the riskiness of individuals within poor 
and rich living areas.  
I define 61 microenvironments within which all borrowers are clustered. The grouping within 
microenvironments is done according to the similarities in the economic and demographic conditions in 
the residence areas of borrowers. The economic determinants of grouping are living area income, 
unemployment rate, purchasing power index and the percentage of department store sales in the total 
retail sales in the market. The socio-demographic determinants are the share of individuals with a 
college degree in the living area and share of African-American (Hispanic) residents in the district.  
Importantly, the proposed two-level structure where borrowers are nested within 
microenvironments differ from a standard geographical grouping where individuals are nested in groups 
according to their geographical locations.  The main difference is that the former structure clusters 
borrowers within microenvironments according to the similarities in the characteristics of their 
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residence areas. This implies that a particular combination of economic and demographic conditions 
impacts the riskiness of a customer but not a geographical location itself. Accordingly, within one 
microenvironment it is possible to have applicants from different areas or cities if their living area 
conditions are essentially the same.  
 
2.1 Data and variables  
 
In the empirical analysis I use the data from the American Express credit card database which 
was also applied by W.Greene (1992). The sample contains 13 444 records on the credit histories of the 
individuals who applied for a loan in the past and for whom the outcome (default or not default) is 
observed. In addition, I collect the data on the regional economic accounts provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) (www.bea.gov). The BEA data includes annual estimates of personal income, 
full and part-time employment, taxes and gross domestic product by states and counties.  
The individual-level data includes personal information, a credit Bureau report and market 
descriptive data for the 5-digit area zip-code. I combine the living area descriptive data with the regional-
accounts data (BEA) in order to define the microenvironments and create the group-level characteristics. 
. 
 Full sample Training sample Testing sample 
Default 1753 1069 684 
Non-default 11691 6997 4694 
Observations 13444 8066 5378 
 
Table 1.  Data subsamples 
 
To compare the out-of-sample performance between the multilevel scorecards and a logistic 
regression I split the sample into two parts. The short summary of the training and testing subsamples is 
given in Table 1. 
I apply a forward selection approach in order to choose the best performing predictors to 
include in a scoring model. The resulting set of explanatory variables consists of 12 individual-level 
variables.  Microenvironment-level variables are not included in this set.  
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3 Empirical analysis 
 
 
This section provides an empirical analysis for the multilevel credit scoring models.  I introduce 
and fit several versions of the credit scorecards which differ by the composition of random-effects and 
group-level variables. All scoring models  are specified with a two-level structure where borrowers are 
the level-one units which are nested within microenvironments, the level-two groups. The two-level 
structure allows to recognize the microenvironment-specific effects which are defined by the random-
effects in the models.  
 
 
3.1 Microenvironment-specific intercept scorecard  
 
The microenvironment-intercept scorecard extends a logistic scoring model by specifying a 
varying-intercept at the second-level of the hierarchy. Including a random-intercept  in the scorecard 
helps to relax the main assumption of the logistic regression of the conditional independence among 
responses for the same microenvironment. The two-level credit scorecard with a varying-intercept and 
individual-level explanatory variables is presented in (1). The borrower-level explanatory variables are 
income (), number of dependents in the family (	
), number of current trade credit 
accounts (
), a dummy variable  for using bank savings and checking accounts (), 
number of previous credit enquiries (, an indicator for the high-skilled professionals 
( !), number of derogatory reports ("), average number of current revolving credits 
("#$%) , an indicator variable for the borrowers who have previous experience with a lender such as 
personal loan or credit card  (&
), total number of 30-day delinquencies in last 12 months  (%$) 
and a dummy variable for the borrowers who own a real estate property ('(). 
 )* + 1-. , 0,12 +   4567890:; < =7 < =>	
 < =?
  <  =@ < =A < =B ! < =C" <=D"#$% <  =E&
 < =71%$ < =77'(                                        (1) 
    90:;  +   =1 < 0,1                                                                                                                                                 (2) 0,1|.,G    ~   I J0, LM> N ,           O  P + 1. .61   S)0,12  +  LT>  
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Given explanatory variables the random-intercept follows a normal distribution with mean =1  
and variance   L>.  The second-level model for the random-intercept includes a population average 
intercept   =1  and a second-level residual  0, as given in (2). The residual 0, models the unobserved 
determinants of default which show the impact of the microenvironment-specific effects. The random-
intercept accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity in the probabilities of default between borrowers 
within different microenvironments.  
The estimation results for the two-level credit scoring model with microenvironment-specific 
intercept are presented in Table 2. I fit the scorecard in Stata by applying maximum likelihood.   
It is evident, that the coefficient estimates for the fixed-effect variables confirm that the 
probability decreases with higher income, previous experience with a lender, house ownership and if a 
customer has both bank checking and savings accounts.  
The last row in the table provides the estimate of the standard deviation of the random-intercept. 
The standard deviation is large suggesting that there is a considerable variation across area-specific 
intercepts among different microenvironments. On the probability scale the varying-intercept explain 
changes in the riskiness  over and above the population average value by U15%.  Importantly, this 
variability is not explained in the logistic regression scorecard which does not recognize a multilevel 
structure of the data.   Given the normality assumption the 95% confidence interval for the varying-
intercept equals :X2.5;X0.06;.  It shows that 95% of the realizations of the area-specific intercepts are 
going to lie within this range.  
 
Variable Coefficient Std.err. z P>|z| 
Total Income -0.044 0.004 -9.88 0.000 
Number of dependents 0.113 0.032 3.45 0.001 
Trade accounts -0.039 0.007 -5.01 0.000 
Bank  accounts (ch/ savings) -0.427 0.082 -5.19 0.000 
Enquiries 0.376 0.015 22.48 0.000 
Professional -0.327 0.093 -3.50 0.000 
Derogatory Reports 0.622 0.030 20.65 0.000 
Revolving credits 0.015 0.004 3.46 0.001 
Previous credit -0.059 0.019 3.16 0.004 
Past due 0.239 0.074 3.22 0.001 
Own -0.321 0.109 -2.94 0.006 
Constant -1.270 0.211 -6.01 0.000 
Random-effects Estimate(Std.err.) 95% Confidence interval 
Standard deviation of intercept, σ[\  0.61  (0.09) [0.43; 0.81] 
Table 2. Estimation results for the two-level credit scoring model with microenvironment-
specific intercept. The random-intercept variance and its 95% confidence interval. 
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In order to assess the discriminatory power of the multilevel scoring model with a random-
intercept I apply a receiver operating characteristics curve (ROC) and calculate several accuracy 
measures using the curve.  In a ROC curve the true positive rate (Sensitivity) is plotted in function of the 
false positive rate (100-Specificity) for different cut-off points. Each point on the ROC plot represents a 
sensitivity/specificity pair corresponding to a particular decision threshold. A model with the perfect 
discrimination has a ROC plot that passes through the upper left corner (100% sensitivity, 100% 
specificity). Therefore the closer the ROC plot is to the upper left corner, the higher the overall accuracy 
of a model (Zweig & Campbell, 1993).  
Figure 1 presents the ROC curve plot for the scorecard 2. Following Hilgers (1991), I also display 
the 95% confidence bounds for the curve which show the ranges within which the true curve lies. The 
red triangle on the graph indicates the optimal cut-off point (> + 0.1376.  This value provides a 
criterion which yields the highest rate of the correct classifications (minimal false negative plus false 
positive rates). Importantly, it is possible to define other cut-off points which are optimal according to a 
specified rule or given a budget constraint. I do not discuss these alternatives in the paper because the 
decision about an optimal threshold is generally driven by the practical considerations within a bank. 
Given a scorecard a lender assesses the costs and benefits associated with different cut-off points and 
then decides which one satisfies his budget constraints.   
The summary results derived from of the ROC curve and the classification table for the optimal 
cut-off point  are presented in Table 3.  
 
 
 True   
Classified  > + 0.1376 D ND Total  
Default 472 1253 1566 
Non-default 212 3441 3812 
Total 684 4694 5378 
Correctly classified 73.00% 
Sensitivity 69.01% 
Specificity 73.31% 
Area under the ROC (AUC2) 0.801 
Standard error (DeLong) 0.005 
95% confidence interval (CI) [0.794;0.808] 
Gini coefficient 0.602 
Accuracy ratio 0.688 
Table 3. The summary results for the ROC analysis for the microenvironment-specific 
intercept model and the classification table for the optimal cut-off point:  7 + 0.1376 
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The area under the ROC curve (AUC2)  is 0.8015. This is 0.095 higher than _`&ab + 0.707 for the 
logistics regression scorecard. The Gini coefficient and the accuracy ratio are also increased 8cab +0.368, _" + 0.414. The 95% confidence interval for the AUC2 is narrow and does not overlap with the 
confidence interval for the logistic regression scorecard (&ab + :0.698,0.716;).  The results confirm that 
specifying a microenvironment-specific intercept improves the discriminatory power of the credit 
scoring model. 
 
Figure 1. ROC curve for the two-level credit scoring model with 
microenvironment-specific intercept. The optimal cut-off point is 7 + 0.1376. 
 
 
3.2 Microenvironment-level characteristics in the two-level credit 
scorecard 
 
In this section I present the extended version of the credit scoring model which allows 
accounting for the living area characteristics. The credit scorecard is presented in (3). It inserts the 
microenvironment-level variables in the second-level model for the varying-intercept 90:;. The varying-
intercept model is given in (4) includes the population average intercept  91 , the random term  0,1  and 
four microenvironment-level variables  g0,h , for m=1,..,4. The group-level variables  g0,h  vary across J=61 
ROC:Microenvironment-intercept Scorecard
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microenvironments but take the same value for all borrowers  + 1, . . , 0  within the microenvironment 
j.  Microenvironment-level variables characterize the economic and demographic conditions in the 
borrowers’ residence areas. The variables are _ih$0- average income in the  living area j measured 
in tenth of thousands of dollars, j0 -percentage of retail, furniture and auto store sales in the total 
retail sales in the neighborhood, &!!50 - percentage of residents with a college degree in the area and __#$%$M  - percentage of African-American and Hispanic residents in the region.  
Including group-level characteristics in a scorecard helps to explore the impact of the 
microenvironment-level information on the probability of default. It also improves the estimation of the 
area-specific intercepts.  
 
 )*0 + 1-.0 , 0,12 +     4567890:; < =7 < =>	
 < =?
 < =@ <  =A  <   =B !  <  =C"  <  =D"#$%  < =E&
71 <  =E&
 < =71%$ < =77'(                                   (3) 
   90   +    91 < g´k <  0,1    g´k  +   k7__0 < k>__#$%$M < k?j0 < k@&!!50                                         (4)  0, |.,G , g0,h ~   I J0, LM> N 
  S)0,12  +   LT>  
 
 
Similarly, to the previous model (scorecard 2) the area-level residual is assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with zero mean and variance LM> . The two-level credit scoring model with the 
microenvironment-level variables is fitted in Stata by using maximum likelihood.  Table 4 provides the 
estimation results for the fixed-effect estimates at the borrower and microenvironment levels and the 
standard deviation for the random-effects.  
The estimated coefficients are very similar to the results for the scorecard without the group-
level characteristics. This is reasonable as specifying the microenvironment-specific variables modifies 
only the random-intercept model. The standard deviation of the varying-intercept is decreased which  
implies that accounting for the  second-level characteristics partly explains the variation of the 
microenvironment-specific effects.  
The estimated coefficients for the second-level variables show the impact of the living area 
information on the riskiness of the applicants for a loan. Higher income in the area has a negative effect 
on the area-specific intercept. A ten thousands increase in income  leads to  -0.17 decrease in the 
intercept . It also true, that microenvironments with a higher share of college graduates predict smaller 
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probabilities of default. This result is intuitive and shows that the impact of higher education on riskiness 
is negative not only at the borrower-level but also at the microenvironment-level.  In contrast, the impact 
of the variable share of African-American residents on default is significant and positive. Infrastructure 
of shopping facilities also positively impacts probability of default. One possible interpretation of this 
result is that good access to the various department stores and shopping malls provokes spending and 
initiate borrowing.  
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.err. z P>|z| 
Total Income -0.041 0.004 -9.34 0.000 
Number of dependents 0.114 0.032 3.47 0.001 
Trade accounts -0.038 0.006 -5.02 0.000 
Bank  accounts (ch/ savings) -0.426 0.082 -5.19 0.000 
Enquiries 0.373 0.015 22.40 0.000 
Professional -0.332 0.095 -3.47 0.000 
Derogatory Reports 0.615 0.030 20.51 0.000 
Revolving credits 0.015 0.004 3.45 0.001 
Previous credit -0.060 0.018 3.16 0.004 
Past due 0.221 0.068 3.25 0.001 
Own -0.285 0.100 -2.85 0.007 
Constant -0.860 0.21 -4.09 0.000 
Microenvironment-level variables    
Living area per capita income -0.017 0.008 -1.98 0.004 
Share of African-American residents 0.012 0.003 3.63 0.000 
Share of college graduates -0.034 0.014 -2.48 0.013 
Infrastructure of shopping facilities 0.037 0.029 1.27 0.201 
Random-effects Estimate (Std.err.) 95% Confidence interval 
Standard deviation of intercept, Lm  0.38  (0.08) [0.24; 0.59] 
Table 4. Estimation results for the two-level random-intercept model with microenvironment-
level explanatory variables.  The random-intercept variance is given in the last row in the table.  
 
 
The predictive accuracy of the model is evaluated by applying a ROC curve analysis after the 
estimation.  The ROC curve for the credit scoring model with group-level variables and a varying-
intercept  is illustrated on Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 2. The ROC curve for the two-level credit scoring model with 
area-specific intercept and group-level variables. The optimal cut-
off point is indicated by the red triangle (1 + 0.2264. 
 
 
The summary results of the ROC curve analysis, Gini coefficient  and a classification table for 
the optimal cut-off point are provided in Table 4.8. The area under the ROC curve and Gini 
coefficient are increased. The AUC  0.017 is higher than in the case of the credit scoring model 
without the microenvironment-level variables. The difference is not large; however, the 95% 
confidence intervals for the AUC values do not overlap which implies the areas are significantly 
different from each other ([0.811; 0.825 ] versus [0.794;0.808]. The standard error of the AUC value  
is small.  
Another important improvement of the current version of the credit scoring model over the 
scorecard without group-level variables is that the former model has a higher rate of correct 
classifications (87% versus 75%). This rate is calculated at the threshold which corresponds to the 
maximal sensitivity / specificity pair (c7 + 0.2264). 
 
 
 
ROC: Microenvironment-intercept Scorecard with 
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 True    
Classified 81 + 0.2264 D ND Total D 
Default 387 384 780 
Non-default 297 4300 4598 
Total 684 4694 5378 
Correctly classified 87.21% 
Sensitivity 56.1% 
Specificity 91.81% 
Area under the ROC (AUC)  0.818 
Standard error  0.005 
95% confidence interval  [0.811; 0.825] 
Gini coefficient  0.636 
Accuracy ratio  0.726 
Table 5.  The summary results for the ROC curve analysis and the classification table for 
the optimal cut-off point:  7 + 0.2264 for the microenvironment-intercept scorecard with 
the group-level variables. 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Microenvironment-specific coefficients in the credit scoring model 
 
 
The credit scoring models in the previous sections assign fixed-effect coefficients for the 
individual-level explanatory variables. This section relaxes the assumption by allowing the coefficients 
on the two variables to vary across microenvironments. Specifying microenvironment-level coefficients 
makes a scorecard more flexible and improves the estimation.  The area-specific coefficients are viewed 
as random-effects in a scorecard which show an interaction effect between the borrower and 
microenvironment-level characteristics.   
I specify random-coefficients for the explanatory variable  and _
 . A varying-
coefficient of    explains that the impact of credit enquiries on default differ across 
microenvironments with different economic and demographic conditions.  Similarly, the random-slope 
of the variable _
  shows that the effect of delinquencies on the credit obligations varies across 
residence areas of borrowers.   
The credit scoring model with the microenvironment-specific coefficients is presented in (5). 
The second-level models for the random-effects are provided in (6).The model for the area-specific 
13 
 
coefficient  k0$o    includes a fixed-effect of credit enquiries (=$o,  a random-term  0,$o and the 
microenvironment-level variables g´k. Similarly, model for the varying-slope k0p  contains an 
intercept =p , group-level variables and a random-term  0,p .   The second-level random-effects are 
assumed to follow a normal with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix  Σ[ as shown in (7). Given 
the individual-level and microenvironment-level variables random-coefficients are allowed to be 
correlated where q is the correlation coefficient.  
 
   )* + 1-. , g0 , 0,ro , 0,s2 +    4567890:; < =7 < =>	
 < =?
  <   =@ < k0:;$o < =B ! <  <   =C" < =D"#$%M<=E&
 < k0:;p%$   <  =77'(                                                                                    (5) 
   g´k +    k7__0 < k>__#$%$M < k?j0 < k@&!!50  
     k0$o   +      =$o < g´k < 0,$o      k0p  +     =p < g´k < 0,p                                                                                      (6) 
 
80,$o  , 0,s-.,G , g0,h2   ~   I t0, Σ[ + u L$o> qLsL$oqL$oLs Ls> v w                                                        (7) 
 
Table 6 provides the estimation results for the two-level credit scorecard with 
microenvironment-specific coefficients and group-level variables (Scorecard 4). 
The probability of default decreases with higher annual income, number of active trade accounts, 
if a borrower has previous experience with a lender and if he owns a real estate property. In particular, 
an average relationship borrower has 1.5% smaller probability than a new customer (no experience with 
a lender).  High-skilled professionals are 8.2% less likely to default. The effect of a house ownership or 
use of banking deposit accounts is negative. This makes sense as a real estate property or other assets 
indicate the financial stability of a borrower. These borrowers are more reliable and have a higher 
incentive not to fall into arrears. In the case of default their property can be repossessed and deposit 
accounts can be garnished by a creditor. Compared to the borrowers who rent accommodation, house 
owners are 5.1%  less risky. Having both checking and saving accounts reduces the probability by 9.53%.   
At the same time, a derogatory credit history positively impacts the riskiness of an applicant. Additional 
derogatory remark in the borrower’s credit profile increases the probability by 15.1%.  
The fixed-effect of the variable    is 0.38 on the logit scale which is similar to the 
scorecard without a varying-coefficient. On the probability scale the marginal effect of enquiries is 9.5%. 
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The standard deviation of the microenvironment-specific slope k0$o  is 0.122 which implies that the 
area-specific slopes differ by U3% on the probability scale.  
Similarly, the fixed-effect coefficient of  %$  is 0.243. The estimated standard deviation of this 
coefficient is  Lxpyz{ + 0.169  on the logit scale. Translating it to the probability scale shows that the 
area-specific coefficient explains the change in the probability over and above the population average 
value by approximately  U4.3% .  
 
Variable Coefficient Std.err. z P>|z| 
Total Income -0.037 0.003 -12.43 0.000 
Number of dependents 0.131 0.024 5.60 0.000 
Trade accounts -0.037 0.007 -4.96 0.000 
Bank  accounts (ch/ savings) -0.384 0.058 -6.56 0.000 
Enquiries 0.380 0.021 17.95 0.000 
Professional -0.312 0.100 -3.11 0.002 
Derogatory Reports 0.605 0.038 15.81 0.000 
Revolving credits 0.011 0.003 2.91 0.004 
Previous credit -0.061 0.017 -3.40 0.001 
Past due 0.243 0.053 4.58 0.000 
Own -0.215 0.081 -2.65 0.008 
Constant -1.380 0.100 -13.76 0.000 
Microenvironment-level variables    
Living area per capita income -0.006 0.005 -1.15 0.252 
Share of African-American residents 0.008 0.002 3.80 0.000 
Share of college graduates -0.025 0.011 -2.24 0.025 
Infrastructure of shopping facilities 0.009 0.007 1.18 0.239 
Random-coefficients 
Estimate 
(Std.err.) 95% Confidence interval 
Std .deviation of k0$o   (Credit enquiries) 
Std .deviation of kp0  (Past due) 0.122(0.019)                        [0.089; 0.167] 0.169(0.074)                        [0.071; 0.401] 
Correlation(0,$o , 0,p)           0.73 
Table 6. The estimation results for the two-level microenvironment-specific coefficients credit scoring 
model: coefficients of the individual and  group-level variables, standard deviations with their 95% 
confidence intervals and the correlation coefficient. 
 
 
I check the discriminatory power of the credit scoring model with varying-coefficients and group-
level variables by plotting a ROC curve as shown on Figure 3.  The optimal threshold which yields the 
maximal true positive and true negative rates is   @ + 0.1406.   
The summary results derived from the ROC curve  and the classification table for the optimal cut-
off point   are provided in Table 6. The area under the ROC curve is higher than in the case of the  model 
without varying-coefficients. The AUC equals 0.824 and the 95% confidence interval for this value is 
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[0.817;0.83]. The confidence interval for the microenvironment-coefficients scorecard and the interval 
for the microenvironment-intercept scorecard do not overlap. This confirms that the scorecard 4 
outperforms the scorecard 2 and 3 by improving the predictive accuracy.  The Gini coefficient and the 
accuracy ratio are also increased.    
I check the discriminatory power of the credit scoring model with varying-coefficients and 
group-level variables by applying  a ROC curve  as shown on Figure 4.5.  Following Hilgers (1991) I 
also display 95% confidence bounds for the curve. The threshold which yields the maximal true 
positive and true negative rates is  indicated by the red triangle on the graph.   
 
 
Figure 3. The ROC curve for the two-level credit scoring model with the 
area-specific coefficients and microenvironment-level variables. The 
optimal threshold is 1 + 0.1406. 
 
 
 
The summary results derived from the ROC curve  and the classification table for the optimal 
cut-off point ( 7 + 0.1406)  are presented in Table 7. The area under the ROC curve is higher than 
in the case of the  model without varying-coefficients. The AUC equals 0.824 and the 95% 
confidence interval for this value is [0.817;0.83]. The confidence intervals for the 
ROC: Microenvironment-coefficients Scorecard 
with group-level variables
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microenvironment-coefficients model and the intervals for the area-specific intercept scorecard do 
not overlap which indicates that the current version of a scorecard improves the predictive 
accuracy.  The Gini coefficient and the accuracy ratio are also increased.    
Given the optimal cut-off point 7 + 0.1406 the credit scoring model correctly classifies 80% 
of applicants for a loan. The true negative rate and the true positive rates are 81.9% and 65.8%  
correspondingly. 
 
 True    
Classified 87 + 0.1406 D ND Total 
Default 450 849 1299 
Non-default 234 3845 4079 
Total 684 4694 5378 
Correctly classified 80.0% 
Sensitivity 65.8% 
Specificity 81.9% 
Area under the ROC (AUC)  0.824 
Standard error (DeLong)  0.005 
95% confidence interval  [0.817; 0.830] 
Gini coefficient  0.648 
Accuracy ratio  0.741 
Table 7. The summary of the ROC curve analysis results and the classification table for the 
optimal cut-off point:  7 + 0.1406. 
 
 
 
3.4 Multiple random-coefficients credit scoring model  
 
 
Section presents a very flexible version of the credit scoring model which includes multiple 
random-coefficients, microenvironment-level variables and interacted variables. This model extends the 
varying-coefficients scorecard presented in the previous section. Complementary to the previous 
structure, I specify two random-coefficients for the individual-level explanatory variables: use of banking 
savings and checking accounts (0 and a house ownership indicator ('(0).  
The two-level model with multiple random-effects is presented in (8). The microenvironment-
specific coefficients are modeled by themselves as shown in (9).  The interactions between the borrow-
level and microenvironment-level variables are denoted by ′| in (8). Interacted variables aim to explain 
the combined impact of the living area characteristics and individual-level characteristics on the 
17 
 
probability of default. I create three interacted variables which are  _
 } __#$%$M:;  - number of 
the delinquent credit accounts in the past measured at the borrower-level and the living area share of 
African-American residents measured at microenvironment-level ; 
 } j0:;  - the  access to the 
various shopping facilities at the area-level and the current credit burden of a borrower; and       _
 } '(~	#$,0:;  - the share of house owners within a microenvironment and the duration (in 
months) a borrower stays at his current living address.   
 )* + 1-. , 0 , g02 +    4567891 < =7 < =>	
 < =?
   <   k0G < k0$o < =B ! <  k0"  < =D"#$% < =E&
 < =71%$  <  k0'( < |                               (8) 
 
   g´k   +    k7__0 < k>__#$%$M < k?j0 < k@&!!50  ′|  +   |7%$__#$%$M:; < |>
j0 < |?_
'(~	#$,0:;           (9) 
    k0ro  +   =$o < g´k < 0,$o       k0    +   = < g´k < 0,            k0G +   =G < g´k < 0,G    k0   +   = < g´k < 0,                                                                                                                         (10)  
 
    0,$o   0,   0,G  0, . , g0   ~   SI 80, Σ[     , Σ[  +  
L$o>000
0L>00
00Lp>0
000L>                                                                            (11) 
 
 
The random-coefficient model of the variable '(  in (10) illustrates that the average impact of 
having a house on the probability of default is 8= < g´k.  The microenvironment-level residual 0, 
explains the change in the probability over and above the population average value. The varying-
coefficient model of the  variable   is similar. It includes the second-level residual 0,G , group-
level variables and  intercept =G . 
The variance-covariance matrix for the second-level random-effects is constrained to have an 
independent structure as illustrated in (11). I’m primarily interested in estimating standard deviations of 
the microenvironment-specific effects and to a lesser extent in measuring the covariances between the 
varying-coefficients. Additionally, the independent structure of the variance-covariance matrix helps to 
speed up the estimation as the number of parameters is noticeably decreased. The alternative types of a 
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variance-covariance matrix specification  (such as exchangeable, identity or unstructured ) are not 
discussed in the paper. 
The estimation of the credit scoring model in (8) can be problematic with maximum likelihood. 
The scorecard is complex and contains many of random-effects which should be integrated out in the 
likelihood. The approximation of the likelihood function can be obtained by applying numerical methods.  
When the number of the area-specific effects is low a numerical integration produces unbiased 
estimates. However, the precision decreases as the number of random-effects increases. To solve this 
computational issue I apply Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) to fit the scorecard in (8). This 
approach is more flexible and more intuitive in the case of a random-effects model where the varying-
intercepts and coefficients are viewed as drawn from the population of microenvironment-specific 
effects. 
 
 
Table 8. The estimation results for the flexible credit scoring model with multiple random-coefficients, 
microenvironment-level variables and interacted variables. The standard deviations of the random-
coefficients are given together with their 95% confidence intervals.   
Variable Coefficient Std.err.    z P>|z| 
Total Income -0.031 0.003 -9.92 0.000 
Number of dependents 0.133 0.023 5.64 0.000 
Trade accounts -0.031 0.006 -5.16 0.000 
Bank  accounts (ch/ savings) -0.368 0.058 -6.28 0.000 
Enquiries 0.366 0.013 27.76 0.000 
Professional -0.259 0.098 -2.60 0.009 
Derogatory Reports 0.607 0.037 15.85 0.000 
Revolving credits 0.005 0.003 2.34 0.020 
Previous credit -0.170 0.068 -2.48 0.013 
Past due 0.233 0.050 4.66 0.000 
Own -0.260 0.111 -2.33 0.020 
Constant -1.890 0.280 -6.60 0.000 
Microenvironment-level variables    
Living area per capita income -0.008 0.007 -1.08 0.286 
Share of African-American residents 0.011 0.001 5.92 0.000 
Share of college graduates -0.094 0.043 -2.15 0.031 
Infrastructure of shopping facilities 0.012 0.005 2.12 0.034 %$ } __#$%$M:;  0.015 0.019   
 } j0 0.310 0.076   _
 } '(~	#$,0:; -0.089 0.041   
Random-coefficients 
Estimate 
(Std.err.) 
95% Confidence 
 interval 
Std.deviation of   k0$o   (Credit enquiries) 0.052 (0.016)                        [0.028; 0.100] 
Std.deviation of  k0    (Derogatory reports) 0.175 (0.085)                        [0.068; 0.453] 
Std .deviation of  kG0  (Banking) 0.048 (0.020)                        [0.005; 0.164] 
Std .deviation of  k0   (Own/rent) 0.664 (0.097)                        [0.501; 0.884] 
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The estimation results for the scorecard 5 are provided in Table 8. The standard deviation of the 
microenvironment-specific coefficient of credit enquiries equals 0.052 which is more than twice smaller 
than in the credit scorecard with only two varying-coefficients. The large variation is found between the 
coefficients of the variable  '( . This implies that the effect of housing wealth considerably varies 
across areas with different economic and demographic conditions.  
The fitted model coefficients of the interactions are not precisely estimated which is not 
surprising, given I only have 61 level-two groups (microenvironments). The impact of the interaction  
 } j0 on default is significant and positive. Similarly, the estimated coefficient of %$ } __#$%$M:;  explains that the impact of the credit delinquencies is higher for borrowers whose 
living areas contain a higher share of African-American residents. The effect  of the interacted variable _
 } '(~	#$,0:;  on the riskiness of a borrower is negative. In the richer living areas with a 
higher level of housing wealth (90% of families own a house) the marginal effect of the length of stay at 
the address on default is -0.2%. 
I evaluate the discriminatory power of the flexible version of the  two-level credit scorecard 
with microenvironment-specific coefficients, group-level variables and interactions by applying a 
ROC curve analysis as illustrated on Figure 4.6. The optimal cutoff-point is indicated by the red 
triangle on the ROC curve. The 95% confidence interval for the curve is calculated according to 
Hilger (1991).  
The classification table given the optimal threshold 7 + 0.1496 ,  the summary results of the 
ROC curve analysis, Gini coefficient and the accuracy ratio are presented in Table 9.  The area under 
the ROC curve is increased. It equals 0.825. The change in the estimated AUC value compared to the 
previous model is moderately small and the confidence intervals overlap. This is not surprising 
given the data limitations. The testing data sample is not large enough to provide all sufficient 
information required for a more precise estimation of a multilevel scorecard with many 
microenvironment-specific effects.   Observing a larger sample on the credit histories of borrowers 
can improve the estimation and increase the predictive accuracy of a scorecard. 
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Figure 4. The ROC curve for the flexible credit scoring model 
with area-specific coefficients, group-level variables and 
interactions. The optimal cut-off point is 7 + 0.1496. 
 
Given the optimal threshold c1=0.1496 the credit scorecard correctly classifies 81% of 
applicants for a loan. I have to mention that this cut-off point implies that a lender weights equally 
true positive and true negative classifications which may not be the case in retail banking. I discuss 
the alternative choices for an optimal threshold in the next chapter where I compare a predictive 
performance between different credit scoring models.  
 
 True   
Classified 87 + 0.1496 D ND Total 
Default 439 778 1217 
Non-default 245 3916 3977 
Total 684 4694 5378 
Correctly classified 81.00% 
Sensitivity 64.12% 
Specificity 83.42% 
Area under the ROC (AUC)  0.825 
Standard error (DeLong)  0.005 
95% confidence interval  [0.818; 0.831] 
Gini coefficient  0.650 
Accuracy ratio  0.743 
Table 9. The summary of the ROC analysis results, Gini coefficient, accuracy ratio and the 
classification table for the optimal cut-off point:  7 + 0.1496.  
                          
ROC: Multiple random-coefficients credit Scorecard
with group-level variables and interactions
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4  Predicted probabilities and goodness-of-fit check 
 
 
 
Section provides several postestimation diagnostic statistics which aim to evaluate the 
predictive performance of the multilevel credit scoring models.  
In general, there are quiet a few techniques discussed in the literature which can be used in 
order to check the goodness-of-fit and assess the discriminatory power of a  regression. However, 
the number of possibilities decreases when a multilevel modelling is applied (Hox (2002)). The 
main complexity in a multilevel model which prevents application of the standard goodness-of-fit 
tests (Hosmer and Lemeshow, pseudo "> is that the model includes characteristics measured at 
different levels. Accordingly, I  calculate and report several measures of the goodness-of-fit of an 
estimated scoring model which are appropriate for a multilevel model and widely applied in the 
econometric literature. Following Farrell (2004) and Zucchini (2000) I calculate Akaike information 
criterion (AIC, AICc) in combination with Bayesian information criterion (BIC).  AIC and BIC are the 
tools for a model selection that combine both the measure of  fit and complexity.  Given two models 
fitted on the same data, the model with the smaller value of the information criterion is considered 
to be better. The mathematical details of the calculation of AIC and BIC are provided in Burnham 
and Anderson (2002), Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978).  
Section 4.1 summarizes the  results derived from the ROC curves for the four multilevel 
credit scoring models and the logistic regression scorecard. It provides a pairwise comparison of the 
AUC measures and test the statistical significance of the differences in the AUC values between the 
credit scorecards. Additionally, I briefly analyse the application of the ROC curve metrics for the 
evaluation of a scorecard performance in retail banking and describe the alternative measures of 
the predictive accuracy. In particular, I compute the area under a specific region of the ROC curve (a 
partial AUC) and show how to incorporate asymmetric costs in the regular ROC curve analysis.    
Section 4.2 provides a comparison of a model fit by applying AIC and BIC criteria.  It also 
checks the discriminatory power between credit scorecards by calculating  Brier score, logarithmic 
score and spherical score (Krämer and Güttler (2008)).  These scalar measures of accuracy allow to 
compare the per observation error of the forecasts produced by the different scoring models.  These 
techniques are relatively simple but at the same time they provide a transparent measure of the 
predictive quality.  
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The graphical illustration of the predicted probabilities concludes the presentation of the 
fitted model results. It visualizes the microenvironment-specific effects and illustrates the main 
advantages of the specification of a two-level structure for a scorecard. In addition, I discuss the 
impact of the microenvironment-level characteristics on default within poor and rich living areas. It 
is found that economically unstable regions contain a larger share of borrowers with a derogatory 
credit history and rich living areas have a higher share of borrowers with a good credit history.  
 
 
5.1 Summary of the ROC curve analysis 
 
In order to compare  the ROC curves and related metrics between the multilevel credit 
scoring models  and the logistic regression scorecard I provide a summary plot on Figure 5.1. The 
plot combines five ROC curves for the credit scoring models which are presented in chapter 4. The 
curves are named according to the shortened notation as given in Table 4.12.    The logistic 
regression scorecard is presented by the dashed line and it is assigned the name "'&7. The "'&> 
and  "'&?  denote microenvironment-specific intercept scorecards with and without  group-level 
variables. The curves  "'&@ and  "'&A  illustrate  the performance of the credit scoring models with 
two random-coefficients and multiple random-coefficients.  
It is evident from the graph that the multilevel credit scoring models outperform the 
conventional logistic scorecard by showing a higher classification performance. Similarly, the 
comparison of the ROC curves between the multilevel models reveals that the scorecards with more 
microenvironment-specific effects provide a higher predictive accuracy.   The two-level scorecard 
with multiple random-coefficients and group-level variables has a ROC curve which lies above the 
other curves.  
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 Figure 7. The comparison of the ROC curves for the different 
credit scoring models presented in the chapter 4. The ROC1 for 
the logistic regression scorecard is illustrated by the dashed 
curve on the plot.  
 
 
 
In order to give the meaningful interpretation to the graphical illustration of the ROC curves 
I make a pairwise comparison of the areas under the curves. The results are presented in Table 10. I 
use the logistic scorecard as a reference model and calculate the differences in the AUC measures as 
following: ∆_`& + _`&ab X _`& , where _`&  denotes the area under the "'&    for l=2,..,5. 
The standard error of this difference given by  j + )j2> < )j2> X 2qjj   as  
reported in the third column in the table (j  is estimated according to Delong (1988)).  
Following Hanley and McNeil (1984), I calculate the z-statistics in order to test if the 
differences 8∆_`& are statistically significant.  The  z-statistics tests  the  null hypothesis that the 
difference between the two AUC  values is zero. The test results and the corresponding p-values are 
presented in the fifths and sixth columns in the table. The 95% confidence interval for the 
differences in the areas are shown in the forth column in the table.  
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ROC 
∆_`& + _`& X _`&ab Standard error 95% confidence interval z-statistics p-value 
"'&>  0.094 0.00566 [0.084;0.105] 16.65 p<0.001 "'&? 0.111 0.00623 [0.099;0.123] 17.81 p<0.001 "'&@ 0.117 0.00615 [0.105;0.128] 18.98 p<0.001 "'&A 0.118 0.00623 [0.107;0.130] 19.02 p<0.001 
 
Logistic regression scorecard:  area under the ROCLogit  curve is  AUCLogit=0.707  
Table 9. A pairwise comparison of the differences between the  areas under the "'& and the ROCLogit. 
The standard errors of ∆_`& are calculated according to Delong (1988).  
 
 
The results of the pairwise comparison of the AUC values confirms the statement made 
earlier that the multilevel scorecards show a higher discriminatory power than the conventional 
logit model. It is also true that  the difference in the AUC  measures increases when a scoring model 
includes more microenvironment-specific effects.  
Next, I discuss the relevance of a ROC curve application to retail banking and list the main 
weaknesses of this approach. In general, a ROC curve is currently considered to be a benchmark  
approach used to check the predictive quality of a model. It is widely applied in many fields. The 
predictive performance of a model is measured by computing the area under the curve. However, 
recently some authors begin to criticize the use of AUC as the standard measure of accuracy 
(Termansen et al. (2006), Austin (2007), Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)). They found quiet a few 
important drawbacks associated with AUC (ROC) measure which prevents its application in 
practice. In the paper  I only briefly discuss the main disadvantages of AUC measure when it is 
applied in credit scoring and propose the alternative methods.   
First, ROC (AUC) ignores the predicted probability values and goodness-of fit of the 
estimated model (Ferri (2005)). The continuous forecasts of the probabilities are converted to a 
binary default-nondefault variable. This transformation neglects the information on how large is the 
difference between the threshold and the prediction. Additionaly, Hosmer and Lemesow (2000) 
show that it is possible for a poorly fitted model (which overestimates or underestimates all the 
predictions) to have a good discrimination power. They also introduce an example when a well-
fitted model has a low discrimination power.  
A second weakness of the ROC curve and AUC is that they summarise a model performance 
over the regions of the ROC space in which it is not reasonable to operate (Baker and Pinsky 
(2001)).  For instance, in retail banking, a lender typically defines a threshold for the accept/reject 
decision within a range (0.1; 0.3).  Therefore, he is rarely interested in summarizing the scorecard’s 
25 
 
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1.0
.0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0
T
P
R
(c
)
FPR(c)
Partial ROC curve
FPR(c2
performance across all possible thresholds as given by a ROC curve (AUC) and related metrics. In 
this case the left and central areas are of the ROC curve are valueless.  
One solution to the mentioned above weakness would be to compute an area under a portion 
of the ROC curve. A partial AUC is an alternative to the regular AUC measure which evaluates the 
discriminatory power of a model over the particular region of the ROC curve (Thompson and 
Zucchini (1989), Baker and Pinsky (2001) and McClish(1989)).  When it is applied in credit scoring, 
the partial AUC is simply the area under the partial ROC curve between two cut-off points or given a 
specific range for the specificity/sensitivity pairs.  Computing a partial AUC is also helpful if a lender 
aims to satisfy a budget constrain or fulfil a banking legislation requirement. For instance, a partial 
AUC can be estimated over the region of the ROC curve which yields the highest true positive rate 
(or false negative rate). The decision about an assessment of a particular region of a ROC curve 
should be guided by practical considerations within a commercial bank.  I illustrate the application 
of the partial AUC to evaluate a scorecard performance over the region of the ROC curve between 
two cut-off points.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Partial area under the ROC curve between FPR(c2) 
and FPR(c1). 
 
 
 
FPR(c1) 
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On a ROC curve plot the performance of a predictive model is visualized by plotting TPR 
(true positive rate) versus FPR (false positive rate) over all possible cut-off points c.  If the TPR 
given a threshold c is "8 + Pr8  | + j8 and the corresponding FPR  given a threshold 
c is "8 + 8  |I + j8 +   then according to Pepe (2003) the area under the ROC 
curve from some point 7 to the point >  is defined as following 
	_`& +    "'&8
  
 +   j Jj678N 
   +   :  ,   j6787, j6781; 
 
where   and  are the continuos variables with survivor functions j and j. In 
application to credit scoring   and  would define the classification scores (or probabilities) 
assigned to the non-defaulted and defaulted customers. Figure 8 provides a graphical illustration of 
the partial area under the ROC curve between FPR(c2)  and FPR(c2) where the c1  and c2 are the cut-
off points.  
On the graph the partial area of the ROC curve is bounded above by the area of the rectangle 
that encloses it. This rectangle has sides of length 1 and 8"81 X "82 which leads to the 
following partial area  
 	_`&h +  "81 X "82 
 
where FPR(c) is the false positive rate at the cut-off point c. This area is the maximum partial 
AUC given c1  and c2. 
 The lower bound for the partial AUC is given by the trapezoid which lies below the 45° 
diagonal line on the ROC plot. The area of this trapezoid is  
 
	_`&h + 88"87 < "8>2 8"87 X "8> 
  
Accordingly, the partial AUC given two cut-off points c1  and c2  lies between the maximum 
and minimum partial areas. 	_`&h    	_`&   	_`&h 
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The partial areas under the curves are presented in Table 10.  I calculate and report partial 
areas for the two regions of the ROC space: between cut-off point  7 + 0.1 and > + 0.3 and 
between 7 + 0.1 and > + 0.2.  Additionally to the pAUC values, the table  provides  the maximum 
and minimum bounds for the partial areas and the relative value of a partial AUC (
ss ¡).  
 
Cut-off points :                                       [0.1, 0.3] [0.1, 0.2] 
    
	_`& 	_`&h 	_`&¢£¤ 	_`&	_`&h  	_`& 	_`&h 	_`&¢£¤ 	_`&	_`&h  
Scorecard 1 0.1036 0.2738 0.0489 0.394 0.0988 0.2191 0.0451 0.451 
Scorecard 2 0.1876 0.3096 0.0705 0.631 0.1609 0.2402 0.0630 0.670 
Scorecard 3 0.1335 0.2190 0.0344 0.635 0.1044 0.1629 0.0302 0.641 
Scorecard 4 0.1362 0.2200 0.0348 0.645 0.1038 0.1596 0.0300 0.651 
Scorecard 5 0.1358 0.2195 0.0350 0.645 0.1054 0.1619 0.0304 0.651 
Differences between the relative partial AUC values 
    
Scorecard 1 2       0.237       0.219 
Scorecard 1 3       0.241       0.190 
Scorecard 1 4       0.251       0.200 
Scorecard 1 5       0.251       0.200 
Table 10. The partial areas under the portion of the ROC curve between the cut-off points c1=0.1 and c2= 0.3 and between 
c1=0.1 and c2= 0.2. The differences the relative partial AUC values for the logit scorecard and the multilevel scoring models. 
 
 
 Results in Table 5.3 confirm that the multilevel scoring models outperform the logistic 
regression scorecard over the region of the ROC space between two cut-off points  1 and 283 . Given the thresholds c1 and c2 the scorecard 4 and 5 show similar classification 
performance. Interesting, given the region of the ROC space between the cut-off point  1 + 0.1 and 2 + 0.2  the scorecard 2 shows the highest predictive accuracy yielding the relative partial area ss ¡=0.67.   
The third important drawback of the AUC value that limits its use as a measure of the 
predictive accuracy is that it does not account for the asymmetry of costs. The AUC implies that 
misclassifying a defaulter has the same consequence as incorrectly classifying a non-defaulter. 
However, this is not the case in retail banking where the costs of misclassification errors (false 
positive and false negative outcomes) are very asymmetric.  
Generally, incorrectly classifying a true defaulter leads to problematic credit debt. 
Management of delinquent credit accounts is very costly for a lender. When a scoring model 
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incorrectly classifies a true defaulter/non-defaulter the costs associated with a past due credit 
account are much higher than the opportunity costs of the foregone profit. This implies that in retail 
banking a lender is primarily interested in increasing the true positive rate in order to minimize the 
misclassification costs of the incorrectly predicted non-defaulters.   
There are several techniques proposed in the literature which aim to incorporate 
misclassification costs in the assessment of the predictive accuracy.  Metz (1978) proposed to 
measure the expected losses (costs) by summing up the probability weighted misclassification costs 
and benefits of the correct and false predictions.  Given the probability of default 	8 and the 
probability of non-default 	8I the expected losses can be calculated using following formula 
   .	
 4 +    &8| ·  	8 · " <  &8I|I  ·  	8I · I" <                 &8|I · 	8I · " < &8I| · 	8 · 81 X "         +    " · 	8 · )&8| X &8I|2 < &8I|I · 	8I <                 " · 	8I · )&8|I X &8I|I2 < &8I| · 	8  
 
where  &8I| is the cost of a false negative classification, &8|I  is the cost of a false 
positive classification.  The cost of the correct classification of a true defaulter is &8| and non-
defaulter is &8I|I, correspondingly.  
Next, I apply the expected loss approach to compare the misclassification costs between 
different credit scoring models. For simplicity, I assume that the cost of the correct classification of a 
true positive (negative) outcome is zero.  The cost of an incorrectly classified defaulter is 10 times 
higher than the cost of a misclassified non-defaulter (&8I| + 100, &8|I + 10.  Table 11 
reports the expected losses a scorecard produces given three cut-off points for the accept/reject 
decision c1=0.1, c2=0.2 and c3=0.3 .  
 
 
Table 11. The misclassification costs produced by a  credit scoring model 
given three different cut-off points for the accept/reject decision. 
 
 
Cut-off point 7 + 0.1 > + 0.2 ? + 0.3 
Scorecard 1 7.97 10.40 11.89 
Scorecard 2 6.16 7.28 8.41 
Scorecard 3 6.19 6.70 7.06 
Scorecard 4 5.97 6.70 7.03 
Scorecard 5 5.94 6.73 7.09 
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Concluding the discussion about the application of a ROC curve and derived from it metrics, I 
suggest that the ROC analysis application to retail banking should be used with caution. In order to 
evaluate and compare the predictive performance of different scorecards additionaly to the regular  
ROC curve metrics  other measures of accuracy have to be calculated and reported. In particular, the 
partial area under the curve,  misclassification rates  and the expected losses given a threshold are 
the good complements to the regular ROC curve metrics.  
 
 
5.2 Measures of fit and accuracy scores 
 
 
 
In order to compare the goodness-of-fit between the multilevel credit scoring models and 
the logistic regression scorecard I calculate and report Akaike Information criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz criterion or Bayesian Information criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC criteria are deviance-based 
measures of fit of an estimated  model. Generally, they are applied to select the model which 
provides the best fit among the range of the fitted models. Table 12 shows the  AIC and BIC criteria 
for the four multilevel credit scoring models and the  logistic regression scorecard.  The model with 
the smallest values of both AIC and BIC  criteria gives the best fit.  
 
Postestimation statistics AIC                           BIC 
Scorecard 1 2991.34 3090.20 
Scorecard 2 2957.18 3062.62 
Scorecard 3 2927.17 3045.78 
Scorecard 4 2909.24 3041.04 
Scorecard 5 2884.50 3029.48 
Table 12. Postestimation statistics: Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC).   
 
 
According to the information criteria the multilevel scorecards (scorecard 2-5) outperform 
the conventional logit scorecard by providing a better fit to the data. It is also true that among the 
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multilevel models  AIC and BIC values decrease with the degree of the model’s complexity. Credit 
scorecards which include more microenvironment-specific effects and group-level characteristics 
show better classification performance. A flexible version of a scoring model with multiple random-
coefficients, microenvironment-level variables and interactions (scorecard 5) provides the best fit.  
In addition to the goodness-of-fit check I compute several scalar measures which aim to 
evaluate the predictive accuracy of the probability forecasts. Following Krämer and Güttler (2008)  I 
calculate  Brier score, logarithmic and spherical scores.   
The Brier score is the mean squared difference between the predicted probabilities and 
observed binary outcomes (Brier (1950), Murphy (1973), Jolliffe and Stephenson (2003)).  It is one 
of the oldest and most commonly used techniques for assessing the quality of the probability 
forecasts of a binary event (default/non-default).  
The formula for the calculation of a Brier score is given in (13).  It shows how large is the 
average squared deviation of the predicted probabilities 	¦§  from the actually observed outcomes  ¨. 
Lower values for the score indicate higher accuracy.  The estimated Brier scores for the credit 
scorecards are reported in the second column in Table 13. 
 
 j + 7∑ 8¨ X 	¦§7  > ,    (~    ¨ + ª 1, 
 !               0 ,  X 
 !«                   (12) 
 
 
The logarithmic score is another measure of the forecasting accuracy of a model. The 
calculation of the score is shown in [5.2]. The logarithmic score values are always negative. The 
scoring rule imposes that a model with the closest to zero logarithmic score shows the best 
performance. The third column in Table 5.6 presents the values of the logarithmic scores for the 
credit scoring models.  
 45~  + 1/I∑ ln 8|	¦§ < ¨ X 1|¯7                                (13) 
 
A slightly modified version of the logarithmic score is a spherical score which was 
introduced by Roby (1965).  The calibration of the score is shown in [5.3]. The values of the 
spherical scores for the credit scoring models are provided in the last column in Table 5.6.  
 j	~!  + 7∑ 8 |s°±²³67|sx²876s°±¯7                                                     (14) 
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Postestimation statistics 
Brier 
score 
Logarithmic 
score 
Spherical 
 score 
Scorecard 1 0.08090 -0.301 0.910 
Scorecard 2 0.06736 -0.235 0.926 
Scorecard 3 0.06252 -0.208 0.932 
Scorecard 4 0.05663 -0.187 0.938 
Scorecard 5 0.05652 -0.186 0.939 
Table 13. The score measures of the predictive accuracy for the logistic regression and the multilevel credit scoring models: 
the Brier scores, logarithmic scores and spherical scores.  
 
The results of the Brier scores confirm that the logistic scoring model produces the crudest 
forecasts yielding the highest per observation error. It also true, that among the multilevel 
scorecards (scorecard 2-5), models with more microenvironment-specific effects provide a better 
calibration of the probabilities of default. The smallest error of the forecasts (0.05652) is produced 
by the flexible version of a credit scoring model (scorecard 5) which includes multiple area-specific 
coefficients, group-level variables and interactions. Similarly, conclusion is made after comparing 
the logarithmic and spherical scores. According to the spherical scoring rule higher values of the 
score indicate the model which produces the more accurate forecasts. The spherical scores are 
reported in the last column in the table. The best results of the logarithmic and spherical scores are 
given by the scorecard 5.  
To summarize the results of the predictive accuracy measures and the goodness-of-fit check, 
I conclude that the multilevel credit scoring models outperform the conventional logit.  The 
goodness-of-fit and the accuracy measures also confirm that the main contribution of the paper  is 
to introduce the multilevel credit scoring model which improves the forecasting quality of a scoring 
model. In particular, specifying the two-level structure where borrowers are nested within 
microenvironments and applying the structure to the model results in the efficiency gain. 
Microenvironment-specific effects vary across groups and show the impact of the economic and 
demographic conditions in the living areas on the riskiness of borrowers. These area-specific effects 
are the unobserved determinants of default. Accordingly, including them in the scoring model 
improves the predictive quality and provides better fit to the data.  
Accuracy gain is essential in retail banking where lenders are interested in minimizing the 
losses associated with lending to bad borrowers (future defaulters). 
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4.3 Graphical illustration of the fitted model results 
 
4.3.1  Microenvironment-specific coefficients 
The credit scoring models introduced in the paper include many microenvironments-specific 
effects at the second-level of the models hierarchy. The area-specific effects are defined by the 
random-intercepts and random-coefficients in the scorecards. In order to make the interpretation of 
the predicted microenvironment-specific effects easier and more transparent I provide a graphical 
illustration and discuss  the variability of the area-specific effects within poor and rich living areas. 
Consider the credit scoring model with two random-coefficients which is specified in (5).  
Figure 9 illustrates the microenvironment-specific residuals  xro,0  of the borrower-level variable  (number of credit enquiries). I choose this variable for the graphical representation 
because the credit enquiries is a very powerful predictor which contains valuable information on 
the previous applications for a loan.  It is assumed that the effect of credit enquiries differ across 
living areas of borrowers. In the second-level model for the area-varying coefficient k0$o + =$o <g´k < 0,$o  the residual   ro,0 explains the change in the probability over and above the 
population average value. The predicted  xro,0  are illustrated by the blue points on the plot and the 
population average effect of enquiries is constant across borrowers and given by the straight red 
line. Specifying ro,0 in the model for the varying-coefficient brings more flexibility in modeling. 
The microenvironment-specific residual reflects the economic and socio-demographic conditions in 
the residence area and explains the unobserved characteristics which impact riskiness of a 
borrower within a microenvironment  j.  
The abscissa axis on the graph shows the microenvironment ID. The highest values of the 
second-level residuals  xro,0 are marked by the red triangles on the plot. These residuals indicate 
low income areas with a high share of African-American residents and a low level of the per capita 
real estate wealth.   
33 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The second-level residuals of the varying-coefficient of the 
variable   .The population average effect of enquiries is  
illustrated by the straight red line. The abscissa axis is the 
microenvironment ID. 
 
 
If the fixed-effect coefficient is assigned to the variable  then the impact of the one 
unit change in the number of credit enquires is constant for all borrowers and implies the change in 
the probability by  U9.25%. This assumption may fail given that nowadays retail bankers offer 
different credit opportunities under various conditions within different living areas. After 
monitoring and analysing the quality of borrowers a lender decides which kinds of credit products 
is optimal to offer. Given a residence area retail bankers may choose to offer credit products with 
only fixed / flexible interest rates  and with / without a revolving credit line.  
The living conditions in a microenvironment may also determine the quality of the 
customers. Richer living areas contain more individuals with a good credit history and poor districts 
have a higher share of borrowers with a bad credit history. A customer has a good credit history if 
he frequently applies for the different types of loans and pays back his credit obligations according 
to the scheduled repayment time. At the same time, a  customer with a bad credit history  also often 
applies for a loan in different places. However, in majority of cases this borrower is rejected because 
of an unsatisfactory credit history which contains many derogatory reports and records on the past 
due accounts. Even if a bad credit history borrower is accepted for a loan he defaults with a very 
high probability.  
For these two, strictly dissimilar types of borrowers (a good credit history borrower and a 
bad credit history borrower), a lender would observe the same high number of enquiries. 
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 Consequently, if a fixed-effect coefficient is applied it leads to the situation when the impact of  
 on default is the same for a good and bad borrower which is not realistic in practice. 
Assigning a varying-coefficient to  the variable 
case the area-specific slopes a
areas.  
In order to visualize the last statement I graphically illustrate the impact of the number of 
credit enquiries on default within the low and high income microenvironments. Figure
illustrates the microenvironment
and five highest income regions (grey charts). The abscissa axis on the graph shows the predicted 
 measured on the logit scale. 
 
 
It is evident, that the impact of the num
pronounced within the poorer 
 
 
4.3.2  Predicted probabilities and living area economic conditions
 
Subsection shows how to apply a graphical illustratio
probabilities in the postestimation analysis and strategic planning in retail banking. Visualizing the 
Figure 14
five  lowest and five highest income living areas. 
 helps to overcome this drawback. In this 
re steeper in the poor living areas and flatter in the rich residence 
-specific effects ( ) predicted for the five lowest (red charts) 
 
 
 
ber of credit enquiries on probability is much more 
microenvironments than within richer living areas. 
n of the fitted model predicted 
. The microenvironment-specific  effects predicted for the 
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probabilities not only makes interpretation of the results more transparent, it is also helps to 
emphasize the role of the microenvironment-level characteristics and explore the impact of the 
economic and demographic conditions on default.  
Figure 15  compares the forecasts within the living areas with different economic and socio-
demographic conditions. The upper graph a) presents the probabilities of default for the low income 
microenvironment with a high/low share of college graduates in the market (orange bars), with a 
high/low share of African-American residents (grey bars) and with a high/low share of families who 
own a real estate property in the borrower’s neighbourhood (red bars). Each bar on the graph 
illustrates the average riskiness of borrowers within a microenvironment with a particular 
combination of the living area conditions. 
 The comparison of the forecasts on the graph a) and b) reveals that the quality of borrowers 
is higher within the richer microenvironments compared to the poorer areas. Accordingly, the 
predicted probabilities of default in the high income areas are lower than in the low income regions. 
However, not only the regional level of income has an impact on the riskiness of customers. There 
are other microenvironment-level characteristics which should be considered.  The forecasts on the 
graph a) show that within poor microenvironments the exposure to risk is higher in the areas with a 
higher share of  African-American residents compared to the regions with a lower share of African-
American residents (21.3% versus 11.1%). It is also true that within the low income regions the 
probability of default decreases if the level of the housing wealth or the share of college graduates in 
the market increase. Individuals within the areas where the majority of families own a real estate 
property are more financial stabile which implies the average probability of default is 7.5% in these 
areas.  
Controversially, the riskiness increases to 25% if a low income  microenvironment also has a 
low level of real estate wealth (the majority of families rent their accommodation). A high presence 
of college graduates on the area job market is negatively correlated with the probability of default. 
The average probability within low income regions with a high share of college graduates is   7.9%  
which is 16.7% smaller than the similar result for the poor regions with a low share of college 
graduates. Similar conclusions can be made if the average probabilities of default are compared 
between different microenvironments but within the rich living areas.  The probability of default  is 
10.2% in the high income areas with a high share of African-American. It is 2.9% higher than the 
average riskiness of borrowers within rich regions  with a low share of African-American residents. 
A house ownership in the area has negative impact on the riskiness. The probability of default 
within high income regions is 5.4% higher if the level of housing wealth within the area is low .  
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a).  Average predicted probability of default for the low income microenvironments 
with different composition of socio-demographic characteristics:  with high/low share 
of  college graduates  in the market, high/low share of families with a real estate 
property and high/low share of  African-American residents. 
 
 
 
 
b). Average predicted probability of default for the high income microenvironments 
with different composition of socio-demographic characteristics:  with high/low share 
of  college graduates  in the market, high/low share of families with a real estate 
property and high/low share of  African-American residents. 
 
Figure 4.11. Average predicted probabilities for microenvironments with different economic and 
socio-demographic conditions.  
 
 
In summary, the graphical illustration of the predicted probabilities not only shows the 
impact of the economic and demographic conditions on default, it also reveals that exposure to risk 
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within high and low income areas also depends on the other living area characteristics such as the 
real estate wealth, share of African-American residents and share of college graduates. Therefore, 
clustering of borrowers within microenvironments in the credit scoring model allows to define the 
effect of the particular combination of living area conditions on default.   
Applying a graphical illustration of the predicted probabilities is very advantegeous for a  
strategic planning in retail banking. It helps to detect the areas where the exposure to the 
unobserved determineants of defaut is high. Given this information a lender can adjust his market 
strategy.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Paper discusses several versions of the multilevel credit scoring models which has a two-level 
hierarchical structure.  The hierarchical structure of the model nests borrowers within 
microenvironments according to the similarities in the economic and demographic conditions in their 
living areas.  The microenvironment-specific determinants of default are explained by the random-
effects in the scorecards which are included at the second-level of the hierarchy.  Specifying random-
effects improves the classification performance of a scorecard and explains the variability in the 
probabilities of default  between the living areas with dissimilar conditions. Additionally, the two-level 
structure allows exploring the impact of the group-level characteristics such as area income or 
unemployment  on the riskiness of borrowers. Given the ROC analysis results and goodness-of-fit tests it 
is evident that  the multilevel scoring models outperform a logistic regression scorecard. They provide 
higher predictive accuracy  and better fit the data.  
The graphical illustration of the fitted model results confirms that within low income areas the 
probabilities of defaults are higher in microenvironments with a low share of college graduates, low level 
of housing wealth and high share of African-American residents. The opposite conclusions are made with 
respect to the high income areas.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
References 
 
 
Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE Transactions on Automatic 
Control , 19 (6), pp. 716–723.  
Anderson, R. (2007). The Credit Scoring Toolkit: Theory and Practice for Retail Credit Risk Management 
and Decision Automation. Oxford UniPress. 
Baker, S. and, Pinsky P. (2001). A proposed design and analysis for comparing digital and analog 
mammography: special receiver-operating characteristic methods for cancer screening. Journal 
of the American Statistical Association, 96, 421-428.  
Burgess, S., McConell, B. and Goldstein, H. (2007). Modeling the effect of pupil mobility on school 
differences in educational achievement. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol.4, pp. 
941-954. 
Coffin, M. and Sukhatme, S. (1997). Receiver operating characteristics studies and measurement errors. 
Biometrics, 53, 823-837. 
Draper, D. (1995). Inference and hierarchical modelling in the social sciences. Journal of Educational and 
Behavioural Statistics, 20(2), 115-147 
Durrant, G. and Steele, F.(2009). Multilevel modelling of refusal and non-contact in household surveys: 
evidence from six UK Government surveys. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 172, 
pp. 361-381. 
Gelman, A., Brown, C., Carlin, J. & Wolfe, R. (2001). A case study on the choice, interpretation and 
checking of multilevel models for longitudinal binary outcomes. Biostatistics, 2, 397-416. 
Gelman, A. & Hill, J. (2007). Data analysis using regression and multilevel /hierarchical models. Cambridge 
University Press.    
Goldstein, H. & Rasbash, J. (1996). Improved approximations for multilevel models with binary 
responses.  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A,  159:505 13. 
Greene W. (1992). A statistical model for credit scoring. Working paper.  
Guang,  G & Hongxin, Z.(2000). Multilevel modeling for binary data.  Annual Review of Sociology,  26, 441-
462. 
Hilgers, R. A. (1991). Distribution-free confidence bounds for roc curves. Methods of Information in 
Medicine, 30, 96–101. 
Jang, M., Lawson, A., Browne, W. & Lee, Y. (2007). A comparison of the Hierarchical likelihood and 
Bayesian approaches to spatial-temporal modeling. Environmetrics 18, 809-821. 
Kreft, I and de Leew, J. (1995). The effects of different forms of centering in hierarchical linear models. 
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 30, 1-21. 
40 
 
McConell, B. Burgess, S and Goldstein, H. (2007). Modelling the effect of pupil mobility on school 
differences in educational achievement. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 170, 4,  
941-954. 
Pepe, M. and Cai, T. (2003) Semi-parametric ROC analysis to evaluate biomarkers for disease. Journal of 
the American statistical Association, 97, 1099-1107. 
Rodriguez, G. & Elo, I. (2003). Intra-class correlation in random-effects models for binary data. The Stata 
Journal,  3(1), 32-46. 
Rabe-Hesketh,  S., Skrondal, A.& Pickles, A. (2001). Generalized multilevel parameterization of 
multivariate random effects models for categorical data. Biometrics, 57, 1256–1264. 
Rabe-Hesketh,S. & Skrondal, A. (2004).Generalized multilevel structural equation modeling. 
Psychometrika, 69, 167-190. 
Spiegelhalter, D., Thomas, A., Best, N., Gilks, W. & Lunn, D. (1994, 2003). BUGS: Bayesian inference using 
Gibbs sampling. MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge, England. www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/ 
Steele, F., Goldstein, H. & Browne, W. (2004). A general multilevel multistate competing risks model for 
event history data, with an application to a study of contraceptive use dynamics. Statistical 
Modelling, 4, 145-159. 
Steele, F. and Goldstein, H. (2006). A multilevel factor model for mixed binary and ordinal indicators of 
womens status. Sociological methods and research, 35, 137-153. 
Teitler, J. & Weiss, C. (2000). Effects of neighborhood and school environments on transitions to first 
sexual intercourse. Sociology of Education, 73, 2, 112-32. 
  
 
